Since its inception The Salvation Army has relied heavily on external funds to survive. There is evidence to suggest that at the time of its founding, in 19th century England, and in its early years, financial statements played a powerful legitimizing role. This was crucial to an organization like The Salvation Army, newly formed and in desperate need of funds. This view is consistent with institutional theory, which emphasizes the importance of such legitimacy. However, it challenges the notion, prevalent in academic literature on accounting in religious organizations, that there is a resistance to the use of accounting as a "secular" activity in an organization with a "sacred" mission. The societal context of the early Salvation Army, the unique characteristics of William Booth, its founder, and its struggle for survival in its early years, all demonstrate an emphasis on an image of financial responsibility, and a reliance on the Army's audited financial statements to provide that image. 
INTRODUCTION
The Salvation Army is a religious/charitable organization, part of a world-wide Christian church, probably better known today for its social work than its evangelistic work. It was founded in England in the mid 19 th century. In that era, when poverty and social injustice were rife, the new Christian Mission, the forerunner of The Salvation Army, became an organization with a focus on good works and a reliance on the public for funding. Even in those early days, the presentation of a sound financial image was vital to its ability to attract funds and to deflect criticism of its unconventional methods. This paper, which is based on institutional theory and the notion of a sacred/secular tension in religious organizations, proposes that in the Army's early years (1865-1892), the organization used its financial statements to enhance and legitimize an image of financial reliability as a church and welfare service provider. These dates are significant because The Christian Mission began in 1865, and 1892 was the year in which The Salvation Army successfully defended its financial practices in an inquiry that was held into its "Darkest England" scheme. The paper begins by providing an institutional view of legitimacy and the importance of financial statements in creating a legitimate image.
Next, the notion of a sacred/secular tension is briefly explored. The significance of the historic setting, Victorian England, is then outlined, followed by a history of the early Salvation Army which focuses particularly on its influential founder, William Booth.
The fundraising activities, reporting practices and controversies surrounding financial management in the Army are subsequently discussed. Finally, conclusions are drawn about the significance of a sound financial reporting image to resource-dependent religious/charitable organizations such as The Salvation Army.
AN INSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF ORGANIZATIONS AND ACCOUNTING
Institutional theory offers an interpretation of the wider organizational and social context of accounting practice by emphasizing the influence of the institutions both of society and of the organization. It suggests that these institutions, which have been described as "societal expectations of appropriate organizational form and behavior", take on "rulelike status in social thought and action" [Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988, p. 562] , and develop over a period of time. Instead of, or in addition to, technical considerations, organizations adopt institutionally acceptable practices to legitimate their existence [Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988, p. 562] , and, ultimately, to receive the prestige, stability, access to resources, and social acceptance they require in order to survive [Oliver, 1991; Ang and Cummings, 1997; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1997; Meyer et al, 1992] .
Because of this, there is a tendency for organizations within a particular field to assume similar structures and practices. This process, known as institutional isomorphism, leads to organizational homogeneity [DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Booth, 1995; Powell, 1985; Covaleski et al, 1993, p. 66] . Consequently, in an institutionalized environment, organizations compete for "social fitness rather than economic efficiency" [Powell, 1985, p. 565] , so conformity with institutional rules ensures survival, and contributes to success [Baum and Oliver, 1991; Meyer et al, 1992; D'Aunno et al, 1991] .
The pervasive nature of accounting means that organizations which adopt "rational" accounting practices are more likely to be rewarded [Dent, 1991, p. 707] . Any organization that does not conform to societal expectations about how accounting ought to be performed, and about the accountability and transparency required in financial reporting, risks showing to disadvantage against its competitors, losing legitimacy and ultimately funding. Financial reporting, therefore, and the accountability it purports to exhibit, is an institution whose legitimizing power organizations must recognize if they are to survive.
Churches, particularly those dependent on the public for funds, cannot afford to ignore societal requirements for accountability, as demonstrated by the presentation of financial statements, auditing and systems of internal control. If they set themselves apart from the legitimizing institutions of society, they risk the achievement of their own mission.
Churches cannot be closed systems because they are dependent on the flow of resources from their external environment. 1 Bielefeld [1992, pp. 52-53] , referring to nonprofit organizations, of which religious/charitable organizations are a subset, suggested that churches must be concerned about "bolstering their reputations, good standing and desirability as fund recipients to enhance and stabilize their resource flows" [ibid] . Booth [1995] suggested that institutional isomorphism meant that management control practices had spilled over from the commercial sector to the voluntary sector, by means of the requirements of funding operations, institutionally acceptable practices and solutions, and professional networks. The accountability that is demanded of religious/charitable organizations, and other nonprofit organizations, as a result of institutional expectations, has had a major impact on the management and accounting practices of nonprofit organizations. Accounting is increasingly being appealed to as an indicator of good management, providing value and legitimacy by its very presence. It therefore has a role that goes beyond mere technical considerations, being a practice constructed "in response to societal expectations" [Dirsmith, 1986, p. 357] . It is a powerful legitimizing tool [Carruthers, 1995] , and nowhere is its visibility more apparent than in the presentation of an organization's financial statements. This paper suggests that this is not a recent phenomenon, but that the early financial reports of The Salvation Army demonstrate accounting's legitimizing role.
THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR
In spite of the prevalence of accounting as an institutionalized activity, it has been proposed that there is some potential resistance to the notion that a church, whose agenda is primarily spiritual, should be concerned with money, and as a result, make use of the practice of accounting, which has its roots in the secular world of money and business. Laughlin [1988] , in his study of accountability and accounting systems within the Church of England, began with some insights into the "central" dynamic" of religious organizations, basing his work on Durkheim's division of all things into the "profane" and "sacred". This notion of a dialectic, a tension between opposing forces, formed the basis for his assertion that within religious organizations there was a potential resistance to accounting, based on the tension between the need to rely on the secular world for the funding of religious work, and the desire to protect the "central sacred sanctuary" of belief from corruption by those very secular forces which helped sustain it [Laughlin, 1988, pp. 23-24] . Booth [1993, p. 50] made the observation that "the dominant ends in (religious) organizations are transcendental, which makes any empirical assessment of their achievement impossible". Accounting and management practices, he asserted, would therefore provide inappropriate measures of spiritual success, but provide a powerful example of a sacred/secular tension.
Perhaps the relationship between a church and money could be thought of as similar to a master-servant relationship. Hegel [1971, p. 175] considered the complex tension inherent in such a relationship, where the servant, in the very act of serving the master, eventually exceeded the master in worth, thereby reversing the two roles. While relying on money to fulfil its mission, a church's spiritual nature requires an independence of belief and thinking, so a tension develops, being resolved by the interaction of the two opposite notions [Gaarder, 1996, p. 303] . The resolution, if made, however, is never set, according to this approach, as the dialectical process, "a clash between a purpose or standard and its attempted fulfilment" [Taylor, 1979, p. 59] , is a continuous working out of the dichotomy between opposites. The difficulty in a Christian service organization is in balancing the mission/money tension in a way that preserves the character of its mission [Jeavons, 1994, pp. 157-158] . This has implications for the way the organization embraces (or resists) fundraising methods, management principles and attitudes to accountability and accounting.
Perhaps this dialectic between churches and money is resolved in practice in at least two ways. Firstly, it may be resolved through the orientation a church has with the world. Kaldor et al [1994, p. 70 ] made a distinction, based on the work of Weber and Troeltsch, between a church and a sect, with the former having an open orientation to the world in the hope of influencing it, and the latter seeing the world as evil, and drawing a strict boundary around its members. The historic orientation of a religious organization therefore will be a determining factor in the extent to which this tension is felt, and the manner in which it is resolved [Irvine, 1999, pp. 16-17] .
The response of members of a religious organization to accounting will therefore have something to do with that organization's historic belief system and culture, and its openness to embracing "secular" practices. Swartz [1998, p. 324] suggested that many religious organizations were open to embracing these practices, as evidenced by the two broad institutional processes at work, secularization and institutional isomorphism. This openness has been observed in other research on the use of accounting in religious organizations. Irvine [1996] challenged the notion of resistance to accounting in the context of the budgeting system in a local church, observing that accounting enhanced the church's ability to achieve its goals. Accounting has been shown to assist members of a religious community in the ordering of their lives, including their financial affairs [Jacobs and Walker, 2000] . The results of a study of internal control systems in US churches by Duncan et al [1999] also challenges the distinction between the sacred and the secular.
They found that the notion that accounting was somehow a "secular" activity was not at issue. Rather than displaying a resistance to internal control as a "secular" practice, the emphasis placed on internal control by churches varied according to their size and the "polity and hierarchical structure" [Duncan et al, 1999, p 142] .
The second possibility for resolving any potential dialectic tension between churches and money is in the way money is transformed through the practice of philanthropy, or for other religious purposes. Jesus advised a rich young man to give away his wealth to the poor [The Bible, Matthew 19:21] . Members of the early Christian church held their property in common, and saw the giving of alms to the poor "not as a matter of mercy, but of justice, for the earth was seen as belonging to all people, and no-one had a right to more than he or she needed" [Singer, 1993, p. 60] . William Booth, the founder of The Salvation Army in England, saw his mission as spiritual but also one that involved the movement in the wider community. This emphasis attempted to break down any perceived barriers between the "so-called sacred and secular", with a great involvement of Army personnel in "that wicked world" [Watson, 1965, p. 274] . Booth believed that "the bad can be sanctified, the secular made sacred -the devil's tunes, the brewer's money, the trade in the market-place" [ibid., p. 96] .
This holistic view is more consistent with the "multidimensional" notion of Christian stewardship, which has been described as "nothing less than a complete lifestyle, a total accountability and responsibility before God" [Westerhoff, 1983, p. 15] . The steward "stands in a relationship of entrustedness whereby there is a responsibility of diligence and faithfulness in the administration of resources" [Mohon, 1999, p. 4] , not just in monetary matters, but in the whole of life [ibid., p. 45] . The Iona religious community in Scotland provides a current example of the way this stewardship obligation is interpreted in practice, with biblical teachings on economics being emphasized as important in the ordering of money and the control of personal finances [Jacobs and Walker, 2000, p. 9] .
As part of this responsibility, individuals also "give account of and for their daily lives"
[ibid., p. 4], since money and its management cannot be separated from the whole of life.
William Booth appeared to have this attitude in the way he practised his Christian faith:
he was responsible to God for the way he conducted himself in every aspect of his life, and the way he managed money, particularly money donated by others to the cause, was a significant dimension of this.
The following excerpt from the preamble to the Salvation Army's Articles of War, a document "soldiers" (members) signed before being sworn in, illustrates the commitment to whole-of-life stewardship: I do here declare that I will not allow myself in any deceit or dishonesty; nor will I practise any fraudulent conduct in my business, my home or in any other relation in which I may stand to my fellow men; but that I will deal truthfully, honourably and kindly with all those who may employ me or whom I may myself employ … I do here declare that I will spend all the time, strength, money and influence I can in supporting and carrying on the salvation war, and that I will endeavour to lead my family, friends, neighbours and all others whom I can influence to do the same, believing that the sure and only way to remedy all the evils in the world is by bringing men to submit themselves to the government of the Lord Jesus Christ [Watson, 1965, p. 26] .
From all accounts, Booth lived a life consistent with these Articles of War, not only in his unstinting devotion to his cause, but in his apparent lack of interest in the accumulation of worldly wealth. He died poor, having survived on the interest on £5,000 [Watson, 1965, p. 94] . In his mind there appeared to be no distinction between the sacred and the secular as money (and accounting) were seen as a vital means of discharging his stewardship responsibilities. The acceptance of accounting was therefore desirable as a demonstration of the faithful discharge of this Christian responsibility.
The work of both Laughlin [1988] and Booth [1993] , which argued for the existence of a sacred/secular tension, concentrated on established denominations with little or no reliance on the general public for funding. By contrast, the early Salvation Army was a breakaway group with no money, no established power base, and no property. This, it is suggested, had a profound impact on the young organization's policies in regard to finances and financial accountability, since it relied very heavily on funds raised from the public, unlike established denominations, which owned extensive property and had developed their own internal bureaucratic structures. At the time of the founding of The Salvation Army the Church of England was undergoing considerable change. Where in earlier times the aristocracy, as well as the tax system, 2 had supplied "all that was required to run the sacred centers and the priestly staff who worked in them" [Laughlin, 1988, p. 30] , by the late 19 th century, this system was breaking down, 3 with the Church losing some of its political power, and its parishioners staying at home. While membership had decreased substantially, however, the Church of England was not even close to the vulnerability (in financial, organizational and image terms) of the young Salvation Army, whose members were well known for taking around the "collection box" at public meetings. It was these factors that established the early culture of The Salvation Army as a resource-dependent organization with a high public profile, outside the boundaries of other religious organizations of the day, with a unique and often unpopular mission. The Army had a desperate need for funds to survive. Its culture emphasized a respect for, and reliance on, a rigorous accounting system and the production of annual, audited balance sheets. These were perceived as demonstrations of Christian stewardship.
(Insert Figure 1 here) One of the institutional elements identified by Scott [1987] as affecting organizational structure was its "imprinting" at the time of its founding. Historical contexts are highly significant, since at the founding of an organization, there will be social structures and norms to which a new organization must align if it is to be successfully established [Dacin, 1997, p. 52] . New organizations must be seen as "legitimate subunits of the larger social system" [ibid., p. 74] if they are to receive the funding necessary for their establishment. In the case of The Salvation Army, this was a crucial factor in its success, particularly in relation to financial and accounting practices. [Chatfield, 1977, p. 121] . From the 1890s, auditing was gradually upgraded as more analytical rather than detailed "routine verification" [ibid., p. 120]. Auditing was increasingly professionalized and founded on concepts of prudence [Maltby, 1999; Yamey, 1977, p. 28 ].
Yet economic expansion occurred against a background of poverty, drunkenness, crime, and substantial inequities in the distribution of wealth. According to Booth there was "no attempt at Concerted Action" [Booth, 1890] to address these symptoms of a society where power was vested in the hands of the few. In spite of the efforts of social reformers to legislate for better living and working conditions, life was grim for the poor. The established denomination, the Church of England had little effect in alleviating the rising tide of poverty and the effects of social upheaval. Ralph Waldo Emerson [1966, p. 142] wrote of the Church of England in 1856 that "it is the church of the gentry, but it is not the church of the poor. The operatives do not own it, and gentlemen lately testified in the House of Commons that in their lives they never saw a poor man in a ragged coat inside a church". Christian Mission, was "to convert the outcasts the clergy did not reach", and then pass them on to other churches. He often came home "bruised and bloodied", and found that his converts would not venture to the established churches [Collier, 1965, pp. 48-52] .
In spite of Booth's authoritarian nature, the Christian Mission had a democratic constitution, and its Annual Conference made decisions about the running of the ministry [Watson, 1965, p. 22] . After years of abiding by the decisions of a committee of 34 people, Booth became increasingly frustrated, so that when in 1876, he was approached by a deputation of evangelists who demanded a more autocratic approach [Collier, 1965, pp. 64-65] , he agreed to join them. He confessed that he did not want to found a new sect, but, in 1878, at the annual conference of The Christian Mission, it was resolved by a three quarters majority to scrap the mission's Deed Poll, create a new Deed Poll, and vest control of all mission property in William Booth, as General Superintendent, "or his nominee" [ibid., 1965, p. 65; Salvation Army Act, 1931, First Schedule] . The founding of this new group effectively reinforced the fact that William Booth and his Christian Mission were outside the mainstream of organized Christian religion of the day. This had implications for the funding of the organization.
Booth had been a keen follower of the careers of Wellington and Napoleon, and adhered to the concept of militant Christianity. He spoke of "siege operations" against the Devil and was described in 1876 as the "General of the Hallelujah Army". His mission took on a military-like culture and was gradually referred to as a volunteer Army, and subsequently, in the 1878 Deed Poll of The Christian Mission, as: "a SALVATION ARMY recruited from amongst the multitudes who are without God and without hope in the world, devoting their leisure time to all sorts of laborious efforts for the salvation of others from unbelief, drunkenness, vice, and crime" [Christian History, 1990, p. 25] .
In that year, Booth composed his "Orders and Regulations for the Salvation Army", maintaining that he could not run his "army" without a system [Collier, 1965, pp. 75-76] .
A combination of rules, and homilies about the lives Salvationists were required to live, it was uncompromisingly strict. In 1879 in Salisbury, a Salvationist and his three sons, thinking the movement "lacked something", brought brass instruments along to their meeting, and accompanied the singing of songs. Hit tunes of the day were adapted into songs for the Salvation Army. Booth's comment "why should the Devil have all the best tunes?" indicated his willingness to use whatever methods were necessary to reach people with his message. of an "unqualified acceptance of military government and discipline" [Booth, 1890, Appendix 2], "the government that God himself has invented" [Wiggins, 1964, pp. 237-238] . This was to include a strict attitude to accounting and an emphasis on economical management.
Early in his ministry, William Booth recognized the difficulty of preaching the Christian gospel to people "whose whole attention is concentrated upon a mad, desperate struggle to keep themselves alive" [Booth, 1890, p. 45] . While his intentions were, at grass roots, uncompromisingly spiritual, he saw evangelical conversion as "a concomitant of drastic social and economic change -less a religion of stained-glass windows and the music of J.
S. Bach, than of soap and a square meal, with noise, cheerful songs, and everyone so busy that they could not be bored" [Watson, 1965, p. 21 ]. Booth's early "random attempts at social work" included the establishment of "Food-for-the million" shops, where the poor could buy hot soup day and night and "a three-course dinner for sixpence". Eventually abandoned because of "administrative headaches", they were nevertheless an attempt to set into place a strategy for offering substantial and tangible assistance to the poor [Collier, 1965, p. 58] .
A formal strategy was offered by Booth, when in 1890, his treatise "In Darkest England and the Way Out" [Booth, 1890] was published This immediate bestseller [Collier, 1965, p. 187] 7 was an attempt to apply the Christian faith to an increasingly industrialized nation. Booth asserted that there was no need to look to "darkest Africa" to confront problems in desperate need of attention. He maintained that of the 31 million population of Great Britain (apart from Ireland), 3 million lived in "darkest England" as paupers, often homeless, and starving. They were the "submerged tenth", and he likened their condition to the slavery that had been so condemned in Britain 60 years earlier [Booth, 1890, p. 23] . His famous "cab horse charter" proposed that human beings were worth at least as much as a cab horse, of whom it was said, "when he is down he is helped up" and "while he lives he has food, shelter and work" [ibid., p. 20] . The plan included a base in London, with farm colonies and overseas colonies across the world.
The establishment of the Social Reform Wing of The Salvation Army in 1890 provides a vivid example of the lack of separation, in Army culture, of the "sacred" and the "secular". While the Army was described as "not a social reform organization", it was one that applied social reform and welfare work "to the principles on which it was founded" [Sandall, 1966, p. 74] . Booth was convinced of the theological justification for a doctrine that included "both personal salvation and social salvation" [Green, 1990, pp. 29-30] . In 1910, on his 81 st birthday, he eschewed a dichotomy between the sacred and the secular, when he described the linkage between spiritual and social work as being essential, the "outcome of the spiritual life of its members" [Sandall, 1966, p. xiv] .
Fundraising: The social reform and welfare work of The Christian Mission, and later The Salvation Army, required substantial funds. Booth's background, experiences and objectives emphasized the raising of money to achieve the mission but not through association with an established religious organization with an assured financial base.
Funding the mission was always a challenge for Booth. He had no wealth of his own and no connections with monied persons. Conscious of the need to attract sponsorship and donations, but with a focus on the "submerged tenth" of society, there was little prospect of large scale fund raising from the upper classes. It was therefore necessary to attract other sectors of society where there might be an appreciation of the mission, and a willingness to support it. Unlike the Church of England, which could rely on income from substantial property holdings, and was secure in its own reputation and image, The Salvation Army was completely dependent on the support of the general public. This required constant drives to raise funds which in turn resulted in the importance to the 7 The first edition, of 10,000 copies, sold out on 20 th October 1890, the first day of publication. The second edition of 40,000 sold out a month later, with third, fourth and fifth editions were equally popular. Profits made from the sale of the book were donated to the scheme [Sandall, 1966, p. 79] .
Army of adhering to established societal institutions, such as accounting, in order to maintain its credibility and image of worthiness.
In 1851, Booth's ministry commenced with the generous support of Edward Rabbits, the owner of a chain of boot stores in London, who offered him twenty shillings per week for three months, in order that he might devote his time to preaching [Collier, 1965, pp. 33-34] . By the time the "Darkest England" scheme was put forward 25 years later, the Army had raised more than £18,750,000 for its work [ibid., p. 185]. The incredible expansion in the work and influence of the Army had occurred by combining a vigorous fund-raising style with strict expense control. Bramwell Booth (William's son) described money as the "sinews" of the Salvation war [Woodall, 1995, p. 18; Thompson, 1985, p. 21] , and from its earliest days, the Army gained a reputation for its constant efforts at money-raising.
The collection box became a regular accompaniment to Salvation meetings, as illustrated by a music-hall chorus of the 1880s: … General Booth sends round the hat; Samson was a strong man, but he wasn't up to that [Booth, 1977, p. 115 readers that over £50 per week was required to keep the mission going, dependent as it was on "the voluntary offerings of the Lord's people". Later that year, "friends" were told that "our funds for carrying on this great work are completely exhausted … brethren and sisters, you must help us or our work must cease" [ibid., 1870b, p. 128] . Constant pleas came from the Army's magazine, not only for money, but for donations of goods: August 1886, to expand the Army's work in Europe. Fifty thousand people were invited to join the "Self-Denying League" and to register their pledge to boost the contents of the "War Chest" by going without "some article of food or clothing, some little luxury, some ornament, some pleasure" [Wiggins, 1964, p. 216] . It became an annual appeal, focused not only on Salvationists, 8 but also on the public.
General Booth, in 1908, said of the scheme, that it had proved to be one of the "greatest religious financial successes of the age", having attracted the admiration of "almost every religious and philanthropic organization in existence" [Thompson, 1985, p. 9] .
Other schemes were also successful. The formation of The Salvation Army Property League 9 resulted in more property being acquired in 1887 than in the previous 17 years of its history [Wiggins, 1964, p. 234 At the end of 1888, General Booth presented a "memorial" to the British Home Secretary, outlining the situation of "vast numbers of men and women" in East London slums. His assertion was that such shocking conditions in which people were living demanded some "special and extraordinary effort on behalf of the state". This was the Army's first request to the government for aid, but their request for £15,000 was denied.
It was to be several years before the British government followed the example set by the Victorian Government in Australia in the early 1890s [Fairbank, 1983, pp. 90-91] , when it provided funds for The Salvation Army to perform charitable works.
Booth's "In Darkest England" scheme of 1890 set a target of £1m. To anybody else, this might have seemed an extraordinary amount of money, but in spite of the fact that William Booth had been "bedevilled by money troubles" since the early days of the Army [Watson, 1965, p. 93] , he was unapologetic about his request for funds to put his scheme into operation. He gave examples of the cost to Britain of various war expenses which greatly exceeded the £1 million he was requesting, and which were paid without hesitation by a government committed to extending its world-wide empire:
When John Bull goes to the wars he does not count the cost. And who dare deny that the time has fully come for a declaration of war against the Social Evils which seem to shut out God from this our world [Booth, 1890, p. 
251]?
Within three months of Booth's call to "arise in the name of God and humanity, and wipe away the sad stigma from the British banner that our horses are better treated than our labourers" [Booth, 1890, p. 282] , £102,559/1/2d. had been contributed to the scheme.
Booth's logic in his Darkest England scheme was that it would not be "irrational" to expect that the government, or some local authorities, would eventually assist in the plan, since it could ultimately be expected to provide relief in the rates and taxes of the country [ibid., p. 267]. The Army was thus willing to be a channel for the funds provided by 10 The Salvation Army packaged tea, and at one stage had 43,344 customers [Wiggins, 1964, p. 225] . 11 Produce grown in the garden would be sold, with proceeds going to the Army [Wiggins, 1964, p. 225] .
concerned donors, and possibly the government, to undertake the work for which they had the vision.
The Army became involved in financial institutions, with its Deposit Bank being set up in 1890. The bank began with no capital, its only security being "Booth's good name" [Watson, 1965, p. 98] . There were 64 branches in England, Scotland, Wales and Jersey, and one third of deposits were invested in government securities, with the remaining deposits being lent on mortgage on real estate. Interest paid was 2.5% per annum, and all profits went towards The Salvation Army [Wiggins, 1964, p. 220 allying "business principles" with "religious practice" [Wiggins, 1964, pp. 230-231] .
These "business principles" included accounting.
Trading was another source of funds for the Army. General Booth had expressed the desire that the Army's social work should become self-funding over a period of time.
There was no shame in being involved in business activities, providing they adhered to strict ethical standards. In all its fundraising schemes, in the Army there was no distinction seen between the money and the mission, the sacred and the secular.
EARLY FINANCIAL REPORTING BY THE SALVATION ARMY
Financial accountability and the proper keeping of accounts were always important to William Booth, and consequently to The Salvation Army. It has been suggested that from the outset the Army has been aware of the favorable image generated by implementing accounting systems so rigorous that they "earned the unqualified commendation of financial experts and authorities who had cause to study its workings" [ibid., pp. 212 We this month present our readers with our Balance Sheet, for the year ending Sept. 30 th . From it our friends will gather how graciously our Heavenly Father has sent us help in this great work during this period. From far and near funds have been sent us. Though often brought to the very verge of a complete standstill, yet we have never had to give up work for want of money. Our conviction is that God is leading us forward, moulding, and fashioning the work, and opening for us spheres as rapidly as we have the right kind of workers to fill them. July 1876 included information about the amount "contributed by the people towards the support of the work", as well as details of other mission statistics such as the number of members, public speakers, preaching services, and "anxious inquirers". Some branches had not submitted financial returns, and no information was given regarding the amount expended in the running of the various mission branches, or how much they held in funds. These summaries appeared semi-regularly in early editions of the Mission's magazine. 12 The balance sheet of the Chatham Branch was included as a model, since it was "all but self-supporting" [The Christian Mission Magazine, 1875, p. 28] . 13 The balance sheet for the Middlesboro branch of the Mission revealed receipts from Sunday offerings, tobacco money, donations, and male and female believers' classes, with a final balance in hand of £9/11/3 [The Christian Mission Magazine, 1876a, p. 54]. (Insert Figure 6 here)
The accompanying comment clearly illustrates that not only was correct accounting desirable, but the "economical" use of funds was also highly praised:
We print the above as a remarkable example of economical Mission work. A powerful Mission has been thoroughly established in a large town, with Mission Hall and Missionary's House well fitted up, and has in twelve months become all but self-supporting; the cost of the first twelve months to our funds being only forty-five pounds! [The Christian Mission Magazine, 1875, p. 28] .
Auditors:
The balance sheet of The Christian Mission for 1877-78 listed Receipts and Expenditure, and was "audited and found correct" by a firm of public accountants in London [The Salvationist, 1879, p. 84] . The publication of the balance sheet for the year ending 30th September 1879 [The War Cry, 1880, p. 3 ] (see Figure 7 ) included an explanation of the policy of producing annual balance sheets, and an assurance that "every penny received and spent in connection with the Army has thus been publicly accounted for from the first days of The East London Christian Revival Society till this day".
(Insert Figure 7 here)
The amount received from "outside sources" represented 66% of total receipts, and there was a recognition that this kind of support warranted financial accountability. Refuting the charge that the Army had never published balance sheets, it was pointed out that the balance sheet, for 1879, was actually the 14th that the Army had produced, and that "a firm of auditors of the highest respectability have audited our books for years past" [The 14 William Booth was reported to place great trust in the public auditors who looked after the Army's accounts [Booth, 1977, p. 116] . Bramwell Booth (the founder's son) recounted a story about Henry Labouchere, the editor of the paper Truth, who was openly critical of the Army's finances, alleging that it had no accounts to show. After one of these attacks, William Booth invited Labouchere to visit the Army's headquarters, and he arrived to find one of the partners from the Army's auditing firm there, with all the accounts ready for his perusal. After one and a half hours of "going over the books, examining the Vouchers, and talking to members of the Staff", he was apparently quite satisfied, and after that, became "more or less a friend". The chief value of his approval of the Army's finances, according to Bramwell Booth, was in the fact that "he was so great an authority on such matters that when he took a thing up and even faintly praised it people accepted its credentials right away" [Booth, 1977, pp. 119-120] .
In putting forward the Darkest England scheme, Booth [1890] made reference to the Army's size, its zeal, its reliance on the power of God, its successful record, and its Army discipline, as proving its capacity to pursue the grand plan. In an appendix to his book, Booth [ibid.] The Salvation Army emphasized its accountability to the public, and its desire to be frank and open about the Army's dealings, including financial management. The Darkest England trust deed provided for the General to be a "genuine legal trustee", with all properties vesting in him. The moneys and properties raised through the Darkest England scheme were to be kept separate from those of The Salvation Army, and any breach of trust by the General would be proceeded against by the British Attorney-General [Sandall, 1966, p. 97] . According to Bramwell Booth, his father never touched any of the Army's money after the first ten or twelve years of the movement. While financial arrangements remained in his name, they were "attended to by others", because the founder realized "the necessity for exactness and economy in dealing with money, both private and public" [Booth, 1977, p. 116] .
In General Booth's opinion, wherever his soldiers were given the freedom to act, they so swiftly proved their worth "to the hilt" that the authorities would soon step in to subsidize their work [Collier, 1965, 149] . The Army was not averse to accepting public or government funding to establish or maintain its work, and this drew attention to the group, sometimes in a negative way. It desperately needed to be perceived by the public as a reputable organization if it was to continue to receive the funding it required.
However, its requests for public money, together with its unusual methods and controversial mission, led to a considerable amount of adverse public criticism.
CRITICISMS OF THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS OF THE SALVATION

ARMY
From its earliest days, The Salvation Army has had a strange and intense relationship with its public, because it has always been a high-profile public movement. It did not confine its activities to church buildings, but went out onto the streets, preaching, marching, and making music. In 1903, recalling the time when the Army began, William Booth said "I was laughed at, mocked at, ridiculed and given the cold shoulder by all sorts of people, religious and otherwise, but I went forward" [Wiggins, 1964, P. 251] . In the early days of the "Hallelujah lasses", 15 any publicity that kept the Army's purpose before the public was thought to be "good publicity", including bell-ringing, a crimsondraped donkey, and other stunts designed to attract attention and enable the Army to present its message [Collier, 1965, 77] . The fundraising efforts of the Army attracted criticism and financial innuendo. Again, accounting comprised an important defense.
Probably because of its high profile, and its constant appeals to the public for funds, The Salvation Army faced criticism about its financial affairs. It attempted to refute these by reference to its scrupulous accounting systems and accounts. These were advanced as proof of meticulous stewardship. The response in The War Cry of 1880 [p. 3] , to accusations that "no accounts of our finances were ever published", has already been presented. The Army argued that "every penny received and spent in connection with the Army has thus been publicly accounted for from the first days of The East London Christian Revival Society till this day".
The Darkest England proposal put the Army in the spotlight because of the vast amounts of money the scheme was to cost, and the donations that it attracted. Figure 9 is typical of the "abusive cartoons" about William Booth that were published in the 1880s. Other critics described William Booth as "Field Marshal von Booth", a "brazen-faced charlatan" and a "pious rogue" [Collier, 1965, p. 194] .
(Insert Figure 9 here) After the Darkest England scheme was put forward, rumors began to circulate about the financial aspects of the scheme. The officer who had been in charge of one segment of the scheme, Commissioner Frank Smith, resigned, amidst charges of financial irregularity. It was also suggested that General Booth kept no accounts of any kind.
Rumors grew that funds raised from the Darkest England scheme were being merged with the general funds of The Salvation Army [Sandall, 1966, pp. 101 -102] (Insert Figure 10 here) ... I have been charged definitely with using the money given for the poor for my own glorification, luxurious indulgence and family aggrandizement ... The accounts of the social scheme it has been alleged are imperfectly kept ... and the whole of our financial statements are unreliable ... It has been said that the money has not been spent at all, or not as proposed ... [Sandall, 1966, p. 92] .
The Times suggested a committee should investigate the fund's legal and financial aspects. In 1892 an inquiry was held by five members, one of whom was Mr. Edwin Waterhouse, the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales. 18 meetings were held and 30 witnesses called [ibid., p. 93] . Access to all records was given, and sixteen of the social centers were visited. In considering whether the money raised was devoted exclusively to the Darkest England scheme, the committee had to take note of whether it was expended in a "businesslike, prudent and economical manner, with properly kept accounts" and whether the property so raised was secured from "misapplication" [Sandall, 1966, p. 94] . The committee found that the money was being "properly spent", and gave the scheme their full approval [Watson, 1951, p. 19] .
The inquiry vindicated Booth, finding that he had "drawn no income from mission or Army funds in twenty-seven years as an evangelist" [Collier, 1965, pp. 195-196] . Further, the committee held that "... books are kept on a proper double-entry system ... audited by a firm of very competent chartered accountants ... vouchers of all payments are kept" [Sandall, 1966, p. 94] . This was consistent with the Deed Poll of the Trusts of the Darkest England Scheme, which gave the General power to "determine and enforce the laws and to superintend the operations" of the scheme, provided that "full accounts of all moneys contributed collected or received for the said Scheme and of the application thereof shall be kept in such manner as to keep the same always distinct and separate from the accounts of all other funds of the Salvation Army" [ibid., pp. 328-329] . The Times, however, suggested after the inquiry that while the social wing of the Army was substantially in debt, the "spiritual wing" was so prosperous that it could advance the money to sustain the social work [ibid., 1966, p. 96] .
The Army was aware of these and other criticisms, and sought to correct these impressions at every opportunity. The tenor of the Army's response was to present itself as a financially reliable organization. The primary claims to financial reliability rested on the provision of a balance sheet audited by a reputable firm of public accountants, the separation of various funds to ensure that donations were used for purposes for which they were given, and the existence of a reliable accounting system, including a stringent budgeting process, and strict monitoring of expenditure.
CONCLUSIONS
The Salvation Army is the product of a number of influences. The vision of William Booth, the society in which it was formed, its own distinctive culture and the institutional forces which influenced it, especially during its early years. Throughout its turbulent history, the Army has struggled to establish credibility, to promote its mission, to develop and maintain its own distinctive identity, and to raise the funds necessary to fulfill its mission. Its survival can be attributed to its ability to maintain an image acceptable to society, both in terms of pursuing its mission and the conduct of its financial affairs.
Accounting, as a powerful societal institution, and as one of the components of the Army's unique culture, played a significant role in presenting an acceptable financial image. From its early existence, the presentation of audited financial statements was a valuable aid to assuring the public of the Army's financial credentials and thereby securing a legitimate claim to the funds it required to continue its mission. Accounting, far from being perceived as a "secular" intrusion into its "sacred" affairs, enjoyed an important position in the organization. It is suggested that other resource-dependent religious organizations, especially those with an open orientation, are also likely to demonstrate little conflict between the sacred and the secular, and to embrace accounting as a valuable legitimizing tool. Covaleski et al [1993, p 66] observed that institutionalization is a "profoundly political" process, reflecting the relative power of interests and actors. Once established, accounting systems were intended to be symbolic and provide legitimacy, actually transcend that status, and are found to influence the way "external and internal constituents think about and act concerning the organization" [ibid., 1993, p. 67 ]. An interesting research question, therefore, could be a consideration of the extent to which "institutionalized legitimating practices … penetrate and influence internal organizational practices" in historical settings [ibid., p. 68] . In other words, does the enforcement of formal organizational practices that have come about as a result of institutional pressures result in "merely cosmetic changes", or do they have an impact on, for example, internal resource allocation decisions [Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988, p 565] ? It may be at this level that there is more resistance to "secular" accounting practices, as suggested by both Laughlin [1988] and Booth [1995] , when accounting actually attempts to do more than legitimize an organization's existence and claim for financial resources.
The functioning of accounting in religious organizations remains a substantially unexplored field in accounting history. Examinations of the practices of financial reporting and internal control in these organizations offer important insights to the role of accounting in the relationship between the sacred and the secular and its significance in arenas beyond the corporate world. The War Cry (1880), "The General Finances of The Salvation Army", 17 January: 3.
FIGURE 1
An institutional view of The Salvation Army's historic context 
FIGURE 2
Excerpt from The Christian Mission Deed Poll … Thirdly:-That the said Christian Mission is and shall be always hereafter under the oversight direction and control of some one person, who shall be the General Superintendent thereof whose duty it shall be to determine and enforce the discipline and laws and superintend the operations of the said Christian Mission and to conserve the same to and for the objects and purposes for which it was first originated.
The General Superintendent shall have power to expend on behalf of the Christian Mission all moneys contributed for the general purposes of the said Christian Mission or for any of the special objects or operations thereof but he shall annually publish a Balance Sheet (duly audited) of all such receipts and expenditure. -There are the amounts sent direct to headquarters by subscribers and others.
"The particulars of this amount and of the expenditure of the same, with summary of the trade accounts, are published in the annual balance sheet, which may be had on application to us, or to the head-quarters of the Army, "The books at head-quarters are not only audited by us, but are under our direct and continuous control, so that we have the full knowledge of all income and expenditure of every kind whatsoever relating to this division. 
